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B
ut Social Security is neither broken
nor bankrupt. And it is not nearly as
fragile as Medicare and Medicaid—
entitlement programs with far more
serious budget problems. Social Security is
running short of the money needed to pay
scheduled benefits, but modest adjustments
can halt that slide. Some argue that those
adjustments should go beyond solvency, to
improve the adequacy and equity of benefits,
better protect vulnerable workers, and encour-
age work at older ages. Although the how and
when are still up for debate, policymakers can
address these problems without removing the
basic protections provided by one of the
nation’s most popular and successful programs.
One measure of Social Security’s success is
the steep decline in old-age poverty over the
past 50 years. Between 1959 and 2009, the
poverty rate for Americans age 65 and older
dropped from 35.2 to 8.9 percent (DeNavas-
Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2010). In 2009, more
than 51 million Americans received $672 bil-
lion in Social Security benefits (U.S. Congress
2010). About 69 percent of benefits went to
retired workers and their dependents; the
remainder went to disabled workers and their
dependents and to survivors of deceased work-
ers. Although the program was not designed to
be the sole financial resource for retirees, in
2008 nearly a quarter relied on Social Security
for 90 percent or more of their income. 
To assess Social Security’s future and dis-
cuss options for reform, the Urban Institute’s
Program on Retirement Policy and the
Rockefeller Foundation hosted three Capitol
Hill events with Urban Institute scholars
and other policy experts in spring and sum-
mer 2010. Panelists laid out the program’s
benefits and challenges, arguing central
points of the Social Security debate. Each
forum, moderated by Urban Institute Fellow
Howard Gleckman, covered a separate topic—
solvency, raising the retirement age, and ade-
quacy and equity concerns.
Program on
retirement Policy
For 75 years, Social Security has kept millions of Americans from poverty, and it remains the major source of income
for most older adults. But over the next 75 years, the program faces a $5.4 trillion shortfall. Social Security’s actuaries
estimate that trust fund reserves will run dry before the end of 2037, at which point the program will have only enough
income to cover about three-quarters of scheduled benefits. 
Some argue that
adjustments to
Social Security
should go beyond
solvency, to improve
the adequacy and
equity of benefits,
better protect vul-
nerable workers,
and encourage work
at older ages.
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•Social Security is facing a $5.4 trillion shortfall,
but modest adjustments can restore solvency.
•Fixes include some combination of increasing
revenue, shortening the retirement period, 
and cutting monthly benefits.
•The system should be reformed without 
harming vulnerable groups like low-income
retirees and disabled workers.
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Solvency: do We need to Fix Social
Security now?
Social Security payments to current beneficiar-
ies are financed primarily through payroll taxes
from current workers. But because Americans
are living longer and having fewer children, the
number of workers supporting each retiree is
shrinking. In 1970, there were 3.2 workers for
each Social Security beneficiary. By 2035, there
are projected to be only 2.1 workers per benefi-
ciary. Additionally, retirement ages have not
risen as quickly as lifespans, extending the
period over which retirees collect benefits.
Does Social Security need to be fixed now?
In 2010, the program began paying out more in
benefits than it collected from payroll taxes
because high unemployment has shrunk tax
revenue and encouraged many to file for early
benefits. But Social Security is not facing an
immediate crisis. It has survived periods of neg-
ative cash flow before when benefits were
drawn from trust fund reserves, and it is
expected to temporarily generate surpluses
again once the economy recovers (figure 1).
Nonetheless, after 2015 the system is projected
to pay more than it collects in payroll taxes 
for the foreseeable future, making some 
fix inevitable. Without congressional action,
reserves are projected to be exhausted by 2037—
four years earlier than forecast two years ago
when the economy was stronger, said Stephen
Goss, chief actuary at the Social Security
Administration (figure 2). Since Social Security
cannot borrow money, once the reserves are
gone, the program will have only enough to pay
about three-quarters of scheduled benefits.
Panelists agreed that Congress should act
sooner rather than later. Making changes now
allows workers to plan ahead, knowing the ben-
efit cuts or tax increases coming down the road.
It spreads the cost out over a longer period and
over multiple generations, allows for more grad-
ual changes, and gives policymakers more
options to consider. Waiting for the trust fund
reserves to run out before enacting changes will
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Figure 1. Social Security's net Cash Flow, 1957 to 2035
Source: Board of Trustees (2010).
Note: Estimates show (1) actual net cash flow of the old-age and survivors and disability trust funds combined from 
1957 to 2009, and (2) projections from 2010 to 2035, based on the 2010 trustees’ assumptions.
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Figure 2. Projected Social Security Trust Fund balance, 
2010 to 2041, under Alternative Assumptions
Source: Board of Trustees (2008, 2010).
Note: Estimates show projected balances as a share of annual cost for the combined disability and old-age and 
survivors trust funds. 
cost more. For these reasons, Goss said, he is
hopeful that lawmakers will act quickly.
Fixing Social Security now could enhance
its reputation. In addition to cash benefits, the
program is intended to provide peace of mind,
said panelist Nancy Altman, codirector of
Social Security Works. Americans should know
that if they become disabled, die, or retire, they
and their families will not become destitute,
she said. This intangible benefit has been
eroded. Ninety percent of Americans are con-
cerned that Social Security won’t be available
for the next generation, according to a poll by
the National Academy of Social Insurance and
the Rockefeller Foundation (Reno and Lavery
2009). Shoring up the program now could
help reassure Americans that it is secure.
With public concern growing over the fed-
eral debt and deficit, the timing may be right to
tackle Social Security. The program is not
nearly the biggest offender, but it’s big enough
to matter, said panelist Andrew Biggs, a resident
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Joyce Manchester from the Congressional
Budget Office laid out Social Security’s place in
the budget: Medicare and Medicaid are pro-
jected to rise rapidly from 5 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2009 to about 10
percent in 2035. Social Security costs, in com-
parison, she said, are expected to go up from
less than 5 percent to about 6 percent of
GDP—not nearly as big a problem as balloon-
ing health care costs or interest on the debt, but
not insignificant either. President Obama’s
deficit commission may be reluctant to adjust
Medicare and Medicaid in the wake of health
care reform, Biggs said, making Social Security
the next likely target. 
Since Social Security is the largest social
welfare program, reform could indirectly ben-
efit other policies and efforts to rein in the
deficit, Urban Institute Fellow Eugene
Steuerle said. Social Security is the “flagship
of social welfare policy,” he said, and sets
retirement expectations for Medicare, private
retirement plans, and pay scales. It signals
when we should stop working, even though
Americans are living longer and spending
more years in retirement. And when people
stop working, they stop contributing tax rev-
enue and start drawing from their personal
savings and public benefits—a shift that hap-
pens earlier now in an average lifetime and
that compounds our demographic imbalance.
Many of these effects, such as a drop in
income tax revenues when employment rates
fall, extend well beyond Social Security.
The options for restoring Social Security
solvency—shortening the retirement period,
cutting monthly benefits, raising revenue—are
well known, though there is less consensus on
the goal and how to get there. Should we aim
to keep Social Security solvent for the next 75
years, the current valuation period? Should the
valuation period be shorter? Or should we aim
for a perpetual balance, to prevent a scenario in
which the system falls into a 75-year deficit just
one year after achieving solvency because the
76th year was imbalanced? The panelists, like
policymakers, had diverse views. Altman said
the 75-year test is an extreme goal, longer than
the gaze of private pensions and other coun-
tries’ public retirement programs. Biggs argued
for indefinite solvency, as a lower standard
ignores the problems ahead. Steuerle recom-
mended automatic triggers—modest revenue
or benefit adjustments that would kick in if
Social Security goes out of balance—to ensure
long-run solvency. 
Robert Greenstein, founder and executive
director of the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, cautioned not to “let the perfect be
the enemy of the good or you may end up…
with deadlock and no progress.” Restoring 
solvency over an infinite period would be dif-
ficult and, in fact, might be politically impos-
sible, but aiming for a mix of benefit cuts and
revenue increases over a 75-year (or somewhat
shorter) period is potentially achievable.
Options for increasing revenue include
raising the payroll tax rate, subjecting more
earnings to the payroll tax, or changing the way
we tax Social Security benefits. The share of
earnings that falls under the taxable cap has
declined from 90 to 84 percent over time as
earnings have grown more unequal. Raising the
taxable maximum to again cover 90 percent of
earnings would reduce Social Security’s 75-year
deficit by more than a third; immediately
increasing the payroll tax rate by 2.2 percentage
points would eliminate the shortfall (figure 3).
Benefit cut options include reducing cost-of-
living adjustments, changing the benefit for-
mula, and tying benefits to changes in prices
instead of wages. A third strategy is raising the
retirement age, which would cut lifetime bene-
fits by reducing the retirement period. 
While reform will likely include a mix of
revenue increases and benefit cuts, the pan-
elists weighed in on whether to rely more
heavily on one option over the other. One
argument for greater revenue increases main-
tains that there is little room for benefit cuts.
The average Social Security benefit is $1,170 a
month, or about $14,000 a year (Social
Security Administration 2010a). While bene-
fits are scheduled to be higher for new and
future retirees even after controlling for infla-
tion, the share left over after rising Medicare
premiums are taken out will shrink. Revenue
increases, some panelists argued, would more
quickly bring Social Security back into bal-
ance than cutting benefits. Other panelists
supported a mix of benefit reductions, arguing
that most cuts would affect high earners who
could easily save on their own. Steuerle noted
that lifetime benefits paid to retirees have
increased over time and continue to rise, so we
should question how we are allocating society’s
benefits to different age groups. Because
higher earners would likely shoulder much of
the burden of balancing Social Security, Biggs
argued their preference for tax increases versus
benefit cuts should be considered.
Steuerle underscored the importance of
programmatic details when weighing alterna-
tive reform proposals. Some proposals affect
older seniors more than younger seniors; 
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others affect different generations differently.
Greenstein expressed specific concern about
“progressive price indexing” proposals
advanced by President George W. Bush in
2005 that would slow benefit growth for
higher earners. He argued that, over time,
such proposals could deeply cut benefits and
affect people with relatively modest incomes.
Greenstein noted that other approaches to
trimming benefits for higher earners , such as
by changing replacement percentages or bend
points (see Program on Retirement Policy
[2010] for details) would have less severe
effects and would be less likely to undermine
middle-class support for Social Security. 
raising the retirement Age while
Protecting Those Who Can’t Work
House leaders John Boehner (R-OH) and
Steny Hoyer (D-MD) have recently pro-
moted raising Social Security’s retirement age.
Doing so would shrink the number of benefi-
ciaries, shortening retirements and reducing
lifetime benefits. It could also encourage work
at older ages and better target benefits to
older adults, but might pose financial hard-
ships for adults with health problems and dis-
abilities, those in physically demanding jobs
who cannot continue working, and those
who simply can’t find work
The full retirement age is now 66 and will
increase to 67 for those born in 1960 or later.
The early eligibility age is 62, but those who
retire early get reduced benefits. Increasing the
full retirement age to 68 (for those born in
1960 or later) would eliminate over a quarter
of Social Security’s expected shortfall (figure 3).
An increase in the full retirement age
amounts to an across-the-board benefit cut for
future retirees (except those on disability and
some widows and widowers), which could be
particularly hard on low-income adults. Some
proponents argue that the age increase really
offsets an expansion in lifetime benefits,
because Americans are now living longer.
Since 1940, life expectancy at age 65 has gone
up 5.1 years for men and 6.0 years for women
(Favreault and Johnson 2010). Workers also
retire earlier now than they did some 60 years
ago when Social Security was new. As a result,
the average retiree in 2008 collected Social
Security for seven more years than in 1950. 
Some panelists supported raising the early
retirement age. Workers eligible for full retire-
ment at age 67 will receive just 70 percent of
their full pensions each month if they retire at
62. If the full retirement age is moved to 68,
those who retire at 62 would get only 65 per-
cent of their full pensions—for many, too
small a sum to protect against poverty in
retirement, especially for those who live into
their nineties and risk depleting their savings.
“At some point, you have to protect workers
from…taking benefits early when they don’t
need to and giving up their longevity insur-
ance,” said panelist Frank Todisco, senior
pension fellow at the American Academy of
Actuaries. He also noted that many workers
might consider an increase in the retirement
age less objectionable if it were combined
with policies that promote work-life balance
at all ages, such as mandatory paid leave. 
But can older adults hold off on retire-
ment and continue working? Americans are
in better health now than they were a genera-
tion ago. In 1983, 33 percent of Americans age
65 to 74 were in fair or poor health; by 2007
that number had shrunk to 22 percent, said
Richard Johnson, director of the Urban
Institute’s Program on Retirement Policy.
Fewer adults work physically demanding jobs,
and more older adults are better educated
now than in the past, meaning more are qual-
ified for less strenuous jobs.
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Figure 3. Percent reduction in the Long-range Social Security
deficit under Selected Policy options
Source: Source: Social Security Administration (2010b). 
Note: Option 1 would reduce cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) by 1 percentage point each year, beginning in 2010. Option 2
would gradually increase the full retirement age beginning in 2010 until it reached 68 for those turning 62 in 2022 and later.
Option 3 would tie benefit growth to the change in prices instead of wages, but maintain wage-indexed benefits for retirees
with low lifetime earnings (bottom 30% of the distribution), beginning with those turning 62 in 2016. Option 4 would
increase the taxable maximum to cover 90% of all earnings, phased in between 2011 and 2016, and count the added contribu-
tions toward benefits. Option 5 would increase the payroll tax by 2.2 percentage points (for employers and employees com-
bined), effective in 2010. Estimates are based on the 2009 trustees’ assumptions.
These three trends—better health, better
education, fewer physically demanding jobs—
have dramatically improved job prospects for
older Americans, Johnson said. In fact, labor
force participation at ages 62 to 74 has gone
up 39 percent for men and 66 percent for
women between 1993 and 2009 (Johnson
2010). While the recession slashed jobs for all
workers, the demand for older workers will
likely be stronger by the time any Social
Security changes go into effect. Looking ahead,
employers may be more willing to hire older
workers as the pool of younger workers fails to
keep up with demand. 
However, age discrimination persists in
the job market. Laid-off older workers spend
more time unemployed than their younger
counterparts (Johnson and Mommaerts
2010a). Older adults with limited education
have a particularly hard time finding jobs.
Any change to the Social Security retirement
age, the panelists agreed, should be accompa-
nied by policies to protect those who can’t
work at older ages. Johnson also recom-
mended offsetting the negative effect on vul-
nerable groups by making Social Security’s
benefit formula more progressive.
Only 47 percent of adults with significant
disabilities receive public disability benefits
between ages 51 and 64—roughly the same
ages when disability rates nearly double
(Johnson, Favreault, and Mommaerts 2010).
Eligibility rules are strict, application is diffi-
cult, and long backlogs leave disabled workers
without help for months. Social Security’s
early retirement benefits act as a fallback for
those who don’t qualify, so raising the eligibil-
ity age could weaken that safety net.
Panelist David Stapleton, a senior fellow
at Mathematica Policy Research, suggested
easing the eligibility criteria for disability ben-
efits and, for the poorest adults, reducing the
age at which those without disabilities can
qualify for Supplemental Security Income.
He further recommended expanding work
supports for disabled adults who can continue
working, while also investing in such work
incentives as payroll tax breaks for employers
who hire older workers. Some panelists cau-
tioned, though, that strengthening the dis-
ability safety net would not help workers who
retire early to care for sick family members or
who can’t find work but don’t qualify for dis-
ability benefits. 
Disability and mortality rates are higher
for low-income adults with less education,
possibly because they have less access to
health care and often work strenuous jobs.
Many do not share the gains in life
expectancy that may offset an increase in the
retirement age. For many low-income retirees,
Social Security is their only income. Poverty
rates for adults with limited education rise
sharply as they near retirement age, but drop
once they qualify for benefits at 62 (Johnson
and Mermin 2009). Making them wait
another year would be a significant hardship,
said Karyne Jones, president and CEO of the
National Caucus and Center on Black Aged.
Monique Morrissey, an economist at the
Economic Policy Institute, also opposed rais-
ing the retirement age, in favor of lifting or
eliminating the cap on taxable earnings.
Taxing earnings above the cap makes sense,
she said, because high earners captured most
of the last decades’ wage gains. As a result, a
greater percentage of earnings have become
exempt from the program’s payroll tax while
lower-income workers continue to pay in the
same portion of their income. 
Gary Burtless, an economist at the
Brookings Institution, favored a compromise
of all three options to close Social Security’s
long-term funding gap—reduce benefits for
high earners, increase contribution rates mod-
estly, and raise the early and full retirement
ages. He emphasized that Social Security retire-
ment ages set expectations for work and leisure.
He also pointed out that while wage and health
disparities favor high earners, disability insur-
ance payments have increased sharply as well,
benefiting lower-income workers. Burtless
5.
Though Social
Security has
reduced poverty at
older ages, some
low-wage workers
still end up with
insufficient benefits
after a full career’s
worth of work.
Low-wage, less-
educated workers,
who are more likely
to become unem-
ployed or disabled,
are particularly vul-
nerable to ending
up with sub-poverty
benefits.
stressed that every available option for restor-
ing Social Security solvency is going to hurt
some people. Pain-free solutions don’t exist.
The challenge is to formulate a compromise
that shares the pain among different groups
while maintaining a well-functioning system.
benefit Adequacy and Equity
Restoring solvency is a priority, but are there
other improvements we can make to Social
Security? Can we do a better job providing
adequate benefits to low-income retirees?
Does the system need to be updated to reflect
new social and family patterns? And can we
afford these changes?
Changing work and family patterns have
created unintentional benefit disparities. The
system was designed in the 1930s for single-
earner, two-parent households, which were
the norm then, but now more households
have two earners, nearly half of marriages end
in divorce, and never-married parents are
common. A married couple with evenly split
earnings will typically receive far lower bene-
fits than a couple with very different earn-
ings—even when both couples contribute the
same total payroll tax. Never-married adults
and couples whose marriages end in divorce
in less than 10 years are not eligible for spouse
or survivor benefits, even though they pay the
same payroll tax rates as other workers. 
Though Social Security has significantly
reduced poverty at older ages, some low-wage
workers still end up with insufficient benefits
after a full career’s worth of work. Low-wage,
less-educated workers, who are more likely to
become unemployed or disabled, are particu-
larly vulnerable to ending up with sub-
poverty benefits. Further, far more unmarried
women are poor at older ages than married
women (17 versus 5 percent). In 2009, about
36 percent of retired workers and nondisabled
widows received benefits that fell below the
individual poverty level (Favreault 2010).
Some experts argue for a minimum benefit to
reduce poverty and near poverty at older ages.
A minimum benefit would fit with the
program’s redistributive nature. Social
Security is progressive, giving lower-income
workers higher replacement rates—a recogni-
tion that they could not live off the portion
they paid into the system. Sylvester Schieber,
former chair of the Social Security Advisory
Board, describes this feature as “insurance
against bad labor market outcomes.” And just
as with any other form of insurance, he said,
if you are lucky enough not to need it and
some of your contributions went to someone
who did, you still benefitted from having
insurance. He emphasized, however, that
changing family and work patterns have
eroded progressivity, and he stressed that the
way Social Security redistributes incomes
should be readily transparent.
But can we afford to make these changes?
Options for a minimum benefit, increasing
dual-earner-couple widows’ benefits, boosting
benefits for the eldest beneficiaries, and extend-
ing survivors’ benefits until age 22 would be rel-
atively low cost, said panelist Virginia Reno,
vice president for income security at the
National Academy of Social Insurance. 
Rep. Nita Lowey (D-NY) has introduced
a bill that would allow caregivers who leave
the workforce to get credits toward their
Social Security benefits. The value of informal
caregiving, Lowey said, is estimated at $200
billion a year. Unpaid caregivers—dispropor-
tionately women—end up with lower Social
Security benefits because of these gaps in their
earnings histories. Roughly a third of Social
Security beneficiaries who took five or more
years out of the labor force to care for chil-
dren have low benefits, compared with only
about a sixth of beneficiaries who did not
(Favreault 2010). 
The panelists disagreed over whether care-
giver credits were the best way to target needy
6.
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Figure 4. Percentage of Enhanced benefits Going to the bottom Fifth of
the Income distribution under Alternative Adequacy Adjustments, 2030
Source: Favreault (Forthcoming).
Note: The special minimum would provide a benefit equal to 125 percent of the federal poverty level to retirees with 30 or
more work years. Under the capped option to increase survivor benefits to 75 percent of the couple’s benefit, the cap
would be set at the benefit received by a retired worker with average lifetime wages. The longevity bonus option would
equal 5 percent of the average age-85 benefit. The income distribution is measured on a per capita basis.
beneficiaries. Some said these credits might go
to higher-income households where parents
could afford to leave their jobs. For example,
less than half of the new benefits generated by
a caregiver credit would go to beneficiaries in
the bottom fifth of the income distribution
(figure 4). Melissa Favreault, senior research
associate at the Urban Institute, argued that
capping the credit and narrowly targeting it to
lower-wage workers could keep it highly pro-
gressive. She stressed the importance of careful
attention to detail and the design of adequacy
adjustments. Since reforms will come in pack-
ages rather than as individual provisions, ade-
quacy and equity adjustments should be con-
sidered as a whole with an eye toward how
they interact with each other and with provi-
sions to restore solvency.
Other panelists were wary about making
benefit changes that would increase the cost of
a program that already faces a long-term fund-
ing shortfall. Paul Van de Water, senior fellow at
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
urged keeping the focus on solvency and not
letting disputes about adequacy and equity
sidetrack reform. Which improvements are
preferable is partly a value judgment, he said.
Should the primary goal be reducing poverty,
rewarding caregiving, improving work incen-
tives, or ensuring earnings are closely related to
benefits? Van de Water suggested modest bene-
fit improvements within the context of improv-
ing solvency. Policymakers could also consider
lengthening the time over which wages are
averaged from 35 years of earnings to 40 years. 
Conclusion
In 2009, a record number of Americans filed
for Social Security benefits, many opting to
retire early (Johnson and Mommaerts 2010b).
That so many count on this program makes it
crucial for policymakers to bring the system
back into balance. Some experts argue too that
Social Security is dated and could do a better
job providing adequate and fair benefits, given
rapid changes to American family life. 
Whatever changes are made should 
protect low-income retirees, disabled workers,
and other vulnerable groups who rely heavily
on the program. Policymakers should also keep
in mind that future retirees and taxpayers, not
the current elderly, will almost certainly be
most affected by reform. How tax increases and
benefit reductions affect different workers and
beneficiaries can vary a great deal, so the policy
details matter significantly. While Social
Security is not facing an immediate crisis, act-
ing sooner rather than later would spread the
changes and costs over a long period and would
give future beneficiaries time to plan ahead. 
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